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Foreign direct investment may not necessarily be the most welfare enhancing form of 
international investment. The host country may avail options like – Joint venture, 
technology licensing, franchising, outsourcing etc. A host country’s choice of 
organizational form should depend on its growth and welfare effects. This paper 
compares the welfare effects of FDI with that of outsourcing in the host country using 
Grossman-Helpman quality ladders framework. If the host absorptive capacity is above 
a threshold level, outsourcing is more welfare enhancing vis-à-vis FDI; while even with 
lower than threshold absorptive capacity, outsourcing being welfare improving over FDI 
is not ruled out. 
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Section 1: The Background  
Globalization, measured by any form – foreign direct investment (FDI), 
outsourcing, international mergers and acquisitions, and cross-border firm linkages via 
joint venture or license agreements has undoubtedly increased in the recent decades. 
Along with FDI, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) has been a growing global 
business
1. Gartner group estimated that the global market demand for outsourced 
business services would be over $300 billion by the end of 2004. McKinsey & Co 
projected that India would generate $17 billion in outsourcing revenues, employing 1.1 
million by 2008. This is indeed a phenomenal contribution not only to Indian GDP, but 
also to global GDP. Global trade thus expands the economic pie and may let both the 
participating nations raise their welfare levels. Blomström et al. (1998), 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) and Borensztein et al. (1998) present evidence that 
inward direct investment has raised the growth rate of many developing countries which 
according to Barrel and Pain (1997) and Borensztein et al. (1998) is due to transfer of 
technology. Increased competition, technology transfer, increased access to world 
markets due to spillovers to local firms, and worker training are some of the channels 
through which FDI can benefit the host economy. The impact of foreign investment on 
economic prosperity has significant policy implications and therefore any policy on 
foreign investment should be based on a more holistic view of FDI. 
Despite the increasing importance of FDI in the past and recently of outsourcing, 
the impact of these two alternative forms of foreign investment on the host countries 
involved has received relatively little attention in the literature. A comparison of their 
affect on the welfare of the host country has become an important policy issue. This 
paper compares the affect of FDI with that of outsourcing on factor prices and 
aggregate welfare in the host country. The foreign firm’s mode of entry affects the 
relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor. The model shows that one form of 
foreign investment may yield higher welfare than that of the other under certain 
conditions. Specifically, it is found that there is a strong possibility that outsourcing 
                                                 
1 Between 1980-98, the amount of net FDI received by developing countries has increased from 4.4 
billion dollars to 170.9 billion dollars, almost a forty times increase. Feenstra (1998) compares several 
different measure of international outsourcing and argues that they have all increased.  
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unambiguously leads to a higher welfare if the host country has high absorptive 
capacity. Such an unambiguous possibility does not exist for FDI. Welfare is different in 
the two alternative forms of foreign investment, because the extent of skilled and 
unskilled labor demand created by FDI and outsourcing are different, which impacts 
their wage rates and hence GDP or welfare.  
The distinction between FDI and outsourcing in this paper is motivated 
essentially by Grossman and Helpman (2003) with a few elements added from 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) and (2002). In Grossman and Helpman’s terms, FDI is 
self-production in a foreign land while outsourcing is production through a contract 
between the MNC and the domestic partner. Grossman and Helpman (2003) is, to the 
best of my knowledge, the only paper that formally highlights the difference between 
FDI and outsourcing. Their model studies the determinants of the extent of outsourcing 
and FDI in the home country industry in which the producer needs specialized 
components. They explain outsourcing in terms of production scale and argued that 
outsourcing takes place instead of FDI if it is prohibitively costly for an end product 
producer to manufacture in-house all intermediate inputs. They show how a host of 
factors like - the size of the cost differential (including search costs and cost of 
customizing inputs), extent of contractual incompleteness, size of industry, thickness of 
the host country market for input suppliers and the relative wage differential between 
the source and the host country affect the organization of industry production. 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) suggests that outsourcing serves as a means to exploit 
comparative advantage underlying in cross border differences with little onus of 
production process contracted out. This is unlike FDI, where extending specialization to 
the level of sub-processes and components comes with higher role for the parent 
company such as monitoring its subsidiary in the host country.    
Another crucial difference that is not modeled mathematically in literature is what 
this paper shall focus on. In particular, we assume that FDI subsidiary is less skill 
intensive relative to outsourcing production unit in the host country. The rationale for this 
assumption is explained as follows.  
First, FDI involves greater technology transfer relative to outsourcing for the 
simple reason that FDI is a part of the parent company, while the input suppliers under   3 
outsourcing agreement are different entities than the multinational. Therefore, with 
higher technology transferred to the subsidiary, it need not engage more skilled (and 
expensive) laborers in order to bring about efficiency. This is one of the reason Das 
(2002) cites for the fall in demand for skilled laborers with FDI.  
Second, the basic tenet of the theory of MNC is that operating in unfamiliar 
economic environment and higher technology transfer (under FDI) taxes a multinational 
in terms of production cost and may defeat their purpose of transitioning into a 
multinational company. Since, the relative wage of unskilled workers in the south is 
lower than their counterparts in the north; more unskilled workers are employed under 
FDI to save on production costs.  
Third, the multinational firm usually chooses overseas direct investment instead 
of outsourcing, due to some internalization motivation. The multinational company 
operating a subsidiary in the host country looks at the skilled worker with suspicion as 
they are potential carriers of the MNC industrial secrets (as a consequence of worker 
attrition), thus a subsidiary inevitably hires less of skilled workers. This also explains the 
lower skill intensity of FDI production vis-à-vis outsourcing.  
Fourth, a recent survey by Hewitt of outsourcing industries in the developing 
countries finds that IT operations and customer relations tops the most frequently 
globally outsourced functions (which are highly skill intensive jobs), whereas historically, 
FDI has been usually in the manufacturing sector. The survey further goes on to predict 
that three years down the line, outsourcing will also increase in finance and accounting 
and human resource, making outsourcing still more skill intensive relative to FDI.  
Fifth, empirical evidence by Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), Sachs and Shatz 
(1994), slaughter and Swagel (1997), Slaughter (2000) also indicates that outsourcing 
leads to a greater divergence between the skilled and unskilled workers’ wages in the 
source as well as the host country, while FDI does not. Greater divergence in factor 
prices of skilled and unskilled labor reflects the differential demand for the two types of 
labor under the alternative forms of foreign investment. Thus, empirical evidence favors 
the assumption that outsourcing is more skill intensive than FDI for the host.  
Sixth, the above economic reasoning and empirical evidence regarding FDI and 
outsourcing is reflected in the formulation of theoretical economic models. Grossman   4 
and Helpman (2005) and (2002) describe outsourcing as specialized or customized 
services by the input suppliers for the multinational companies, implying greater 
intensity of skilled labor in production by the outsourcing partner. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996a) model also indicates that outsourcing is a skill intensive activity from the point 
of view of the host country (as well as the source country). Xu (2000) suggests for FDI 
that a relative increase in skilled biased demand shifts in all the sectors does not 
necessarily imply skill-biased demand shift in the country because FDI may be unskilled 
labor-intensive activity in the host country. Moreover, Markusen and Venables (1999a) 
comparison of the real wage of skilled labor between countries reveals that the entry of 
multinationals through FDI creates a tendency towards factor price equalization. Given 
that, to begin with, the developing country (South) has higher relative wage for skilled 
labor vis-à-vis the developed country (North), factor price equalization would imply that 
direct foreign investment entry might lower the wage of skilled labor in the skilled-labor 
scarce country (host country). Relative wages of skilled labor may fall under FDI if FDI 
has low skill intensity.  
Two innovations are attempted in this paper. First we formally distinguish 
between the two forms of foreign investment - FDI and outsourcing in a unified 
framework and second we choose to address the problem from the point of view of a 
host country with non-homogeneous labor. This model is different from Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996b) as international outsourcing and FDI are together knit as part of a 
product cycle framework in which multinationals are triggered by cost saving 
opportunities. We allow for substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor in 
manufacturing, a feature, which is missing in Glass and Saggi (2001). The model is a 
variant of the standard North-South quality ladders growth model of Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) as in Glass and Saggi (2001) but enriched by introducing heterogeneity 
of labor. The model’s framework shares similarity with Reis (2001), however, with one 
difference. In this model, we assume that the good produced by the multinational is not 
competitive with the good produced by the domestic firms in the South. Hence, 
multinationals do not drive the Southern firms out of the market. However, the 
multinationals do compete for labor with the Southern firms, which may affect wages 
and output of the perfectly competitive Southern firms.    5 
Keeping the basic premise of our model in mind, that is, outsourcing partners use 
more skill intensive technique of production than their counterparts in a subsidiary, we 
move on to outline the organization of this paper. Section 2 builds up the model; section 
3 characterizes equilibrium in the host country and the conditions under which one form 
of foreign investment scores over the other in terms of welfare. Section 4 demonstrates 
a comparative static exercise of the impact of investment in human capital in the South 
on welfare in the host country. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
Section 2: The Model 
This section builds a North-South framework that specifically revolves around the 
events happening in the host country. Each country is endowed with two types of 
inelastically supplied labor, the skilled and the unskilled labor, who are consumers of 
final goods.  
Consumers in the world economy derive utility from consumption of two kinds of 
goods. One of the consumption goods is the homogeneous agricultural good, which is 
produced only in the South under perfect competition. The other good, which enters the 
utility function of the consumers, is the vertically differentiated manufacturing good. By 
definition, within the manufacturing products, consumers derive more utility from higher 
quality manufacturing products and are willing to pay a premium for higher quality. This 
gives manufacturing firms an incentive to do expensive R&D and innovate to climb up 
the quality ladder. The technological capability of the firms in the South is assumed to 
be low and therefore, only the northern firms carry out innovation. Imitation is ruled out 
in the model. 
A product cycle is generated in which shifts in production to the South may occur 
either through FDI or outsourcing. FDI and outsourcing are modeled as mutually 
exclusive forms of foreign investment. This is unlike Grossman and Helpman (2003) 
where FDI and outsourcing co-exist in the industry. Even though the assumption is less 
realistic, its essential to evaluate the independent impact of each of these forms of 
foreign investment on host country welfare and factor prices. Our approach is similar to 
Ottaviano and Turrini (2003), where they model exports, FDI and outsourcing as   6 
mutually exclusive ways of capturing the Southern market. Glass and Saggi (2002) also 
allow their forms of foreign investment, FDI and licensing to co-exist but this can be 
attributed to the simplicity of their model. The starting point of the model by Glass and 
Saggi is the optimal mode choice by the multinational firm and growth effects 
automatically follow. They assume away any changes in wages in their symmetric two-
country model due to changes in mode shifts. Moreover, a change in innovation 
intensity emanating from the relative measure of FDI or licensing is the only driving 
force for growth in their model. In the model presented below, we ignore the problem of 
mode choice between FDI and outsourcing from the perspective of the multinational 
firm, and focus on the preferred mode of foreign investment by the host country 
government. This kind of approach comes from the belief that profit maximization is the 
only motive that drives a firm to choose a particular form of foreign investment. 
Therefore, a host country government can always frame incentive schemes to attract 
that very mode of foreign investment that brings higher welfare for its economy.  
To make matters simple, we assume that the host country is a relatively small 
open economy to be able to affect any of the variables in the North or the source 
country. Therefore, variables like northern wages, measure of Northern firms are 
exogenously given for Southern steady state equilibrium. On the other hand, the 
multinationals in the host country are large enough to impinge on the labor markets in 
the host country and hence affect wages and welfare.  
 
Section 2.1: Household Behavior 
Section 2.1.1: Consumption  
Consumers’ problem is modeled in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
quality ladders model. Consumers live in one of the two countries, North or South, h ∈  
{N, S}, belong to one of the labor types, l ∈ {1, 2}, 1 for unskilled labor and 2 for skilled 
labor. Consumers take market variables as given and maximize a Cobb Douglas Utility 
function increasing in consumption of homogeneous good y and an aggregate X of the 
vertically differentiated manufacturing good whose price varies according to the stage of 
the product cycle. For consumption of X, consumers choose from a continuum of 
manufacturing products indexed by j ∈  [0, 1] available in discrete quality levels indexed   7 
by m. Quality level
2 m of product j provides quality 
m
m j q ξ ≡ ) ( . All consumers value 
higher quality of manufacturing goods, that is,  . 1 > ξ ξ denotes the innovation size or 
magnitude of the quality jump. 
The utility function of a representative consumer in country h and of labor type l  
is given by: 
γ γ − Χ =
1 ] [ ] [ l l l y U   l ∈ {1(unskilled),  2(skilled)}    (1)   
 y, which is the homogeneous perfectly competitive agricultural good is chosen to 
be the numeraire while X, the aggregate vertically differentiated manufacturing good is 
represented as: 








l dj j x ξ         ( 2 )  
Where  m ξ is the assessment of quality level m and  ) ( , j x
h
m l is the consumption of 
quality level m of product j by labor type l in country h.  
The consumers maximize the utility as given by the utility function in (1) subject 






l E X P y = +         ( 3 )  
Where  h
l E  is the income of a representative labor type l  residing in country h and 
P is the composite price of the manufacturing good. Maximizing (1) subject to (3), and 
aggregating over both countries and both types of labor we get the aggregate demands 
of the homogeneous agricultural good and the vertically differentiated manufacturing 
goods as: 
  E y ) 1 ( γ − =          ( 4 )  
  E X P γ =          ( 5 )  
Where  
 
S S N S N L w L w E E E E 2 2 1 1 + + = + =         ( 6 )  
(
S
l L  denotes employment of type l labor in South and  l w the corresponding wage). 
                                                 
2 Since this is a static model we look at one discrete level jump in quality that generates a product cycle.   8 
Specifically, E includes the wage income of the Southern laborers, wage income of the 
northern laborers and profits of the firms in the two countries. As mentioned before, 
South being small country cannot influence 
N E .  
A consumer utility maximization problem is broken in three stages. In stage one, 
they decide on the proportion of expenditure to be spent on manufacturing and 
agricultural goods. In stage two, they allocate the available expenditure for each 
product. In the final stage, the consumer allocates spending for each product to the 
quality level  ) ( ~ j m offering the lowest quality adjusted price. Thus, in equilibrium, the 
consumers choose only one quality of a product that has lowest quality adjusted price. 
Same quality level is chosen irrespective of the country of residence or the type of labor 
because there is a unique quality of a product that has lowest adjusted price.  
In the second stage, the consumer evenly spreads spending across the unit 




l E j E γ γ = ) ( as the elasticity of substitution between various 
products of the manufacturing sector is assumed to be unity. Aggregate Consumers 
demand  ) ( ) ( ~ ~ j p E j x m m γ = units of quality level  ) ( ~ j m of product j and no other units of 
other quality level of that product.  
 
Section 2.2: Producers 
Section 2.2.1: Production Structure 
The consumers are willing to pay a premium of ξ for a single jump in the quality 
of the product, which motivates the firm to indulge in costly R&D of innovating higher 
quality levels. Assuming that the potential for quality improvement is unbounded, only 
the northern firms has the ability to drive forward the world quality frontier for the 
existing products through innovation. While R&D races in the North occur 
simultaneously for all products within the X sector, entrepreneurs in the South are 
inefficient at innovation or imitation. Once a higher quality product is developed, 
northern firms undertake its production and reap profits. As in Vernon (1966), we also 
assume that a product developed in the north is produced by the northern firms till its 
production gets standardized. Once its production is standardized, as in Glass and 
Saggi (2001), Markusen and Venables (1998), the northern firm has the opportunity to   9 
become a MNC by shifting its basic stage of production to a low cost nation either 
through FDI or outsourcing. 
Outsourcing is a more transaction intensive process vis-à-vis subsidiary 
formation. Grossman and Helpman (2003) describe the formation of outsourcing 
relationship as a two-stage process – first, the investment contract and then the order 
contract. Even though the process of finding an outsourcing partner in South is much 
more complicated
3 than setting up a subsidiary unit, we abstract from such differences 
to focus on the welfare comparison issue. This simplifying assumption implies that the 
regime shift in the host country from FDI equilibrium to outsourcing equilibrium (or vice-
versa) entails only one exogenous change, that is, the change in the technology of 
production (via the exogenous change in skill intensity). 
At this stage, perhaps it is worth mentioning that outsourcing may seem to share 
similarities with licensing. However, in essence it is a very different process than 
licensing. Licensing implies sale of technology to a host country entrepreneur while 
outsourcing is a contract to produce a part/stage of total output, that is, outsourcing 
usually involves fragmentation of the production process while licensing does not. 
Outsourcing partners in the host country provide one of the inputs for the final good 
produced by the multinational company whereas, the licensee produces the entire 
product herself and directly sells it to the market. Second, even though licensing also 
involves finding a match between the licensor and the licensee but the nature of these 
search or matching process is very different under outsourcing. In literature, licensee 
search has been modeled more like an auction (Casson and Buckley, 1981 and 
Casson, 1979) while searching for outsourcing partners have been modeled in a 
manner similar to R&D (Grossman and Helpman, 2002a). Third, once the license is sold 
to the licensee he is usually free from any kind of inspection of production process, per 
contra, outsourcing partner contributes to an input in the final good produced by the 
MNC. Therefore, appraisal and quality check of the partner’s product is a must. Thus, 
outsourcing is a much longer term and interactive relationship than simply licensing. 
                                                 
3 Finding an appropriate partner in the South, Grossman and Helpman (2005),  entails search R&D on the 
part of the prospective MNC. The probability of finding the partner as in Grossman and Helpman (2005) 
depends on market thickness, legal environment in the South and also by the skill intensity of production 
being
 transferred.   10 
Fourth, if a licensor makes effort to internalize and assimilate and further improve the 
technology, it is purely his gain, while if the outsourcing partner builds on the technology 
given by the multinational, both agents gain. Fifth, usually the licensing contract 
specifies ex-ante how much a licensor earns in the profit and also the royalty fee while 
under an outsourcing contract this decision is made ex-post production. 
Getting back to the model, shifting a part of a multinational firm production to the 
South whether through creating a subsidiary or through contracting out to outsourcing 
partner firm, lowers its cost of production and drives the northern firms out of the 
market. On the other hand, the MNC may also be driven out of the market by further 
innovation by the northern firms, (See figure 1). 
 
Section 2.2.2: Manufacturing Technology   
Assume that the production under the multinational firm is separated into two 
stages – the basic stage of production and the advanced stage. As in Glass and Saggi 
(2001), we assume that to produce one unit of final good, a multinational firm must 
combine α  units of output from basic stage of production with (1 – α ) units of output 
from advanced stage of production produced in the North. This can be envisioned as a 
fragmented production structure whereby advanced production
4 involves the 
manufacturing of sophisticated intermediate inputs and basic production involves the 
bundling of final goods by using these intermediate inputs. Per contra, Glass and Saggi 
(2001) assume that one unit of labor is required for producing one unit of output, which 
makes their production strategy very rigid as labor requirements do not respond to 
factor prices. Moreover, they do not distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor, and 
as a result their model does not allow for any substitutability across factors of 
production. We do away with these assumptions in our model. 
We use a standard neoclassical production function. The production technology 
of MNC is represented as: 
 
                                                 
4 Glass (2004b) explains the fundamental assumption behind the reason for not transitioning the entire 
production process to the South. This follows as a direct
 implication of the assumption of inefficiency of 
South in handling the advanced stage of production. 
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  ) , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( 2 1 2 1
S S N N N M L L f L L f X
B
i α α + − =  
 
Out of the total manufacturing output produced by the multinational firm  ) 1 ( α −  is 
produced using multinational technology in North and α  using the subsidiary or the 
outsourcing partner technology,  ) , ( 2 1
S S L L f
B
i in South. It should be noted that the 
technology of production is different for FDI subsidiary and outsourcing partner and thus 
the subscript i ε  {q(FDI), o(Outsourcing)}. 
The marginal cost (MC) of production of the Multinational firm is a weighted sum 
of basic stage MC incurred by the MNC production unit in the South,  B MC (by subsidiary 
or outsourcing partner) and advanced stage MC incurred by the MNC production unit in 
the North,  N






i MC MC MC α α + − = 1  
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i , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 ) ( ) ( 1 + + − = α α     (7) 
  ) ( ,
h k
i l w a  is the unit/marginal requirement
5 of type l Southern labor, under MNC entry 
mode i, by the firm type k ε  {S(Southern domestic firms), B(subsidiary or outsourcing 
partner in South)}
6.  
Southern domestic firms produce the homogeneous good y under perfect 
competition with a CRS production function,  ) , ( 2 1
S S S L L f . The marginal cost of production 
in a Southern firm producing agricultural good y is given by: 
 
                                                 
5 It is well known that for a neo-classical, constant returns to scale production function, the unit labor 
requirements is equal to the marginal labor requirement and
 that these coefficients of labor requirements 









 represent the relative wage of skilled 
labor for country h = N, S. To obtain the unit/marginal labor requirements, we
 consider the implied cost 
function and use Shephard’s lemma along with homogenous of degree one property of the production 
function. 
6 For example,  ) ( , 1
S S
q w a is the unskilled labor requirement by the Southern firms under FDI and similarly, 
) ( , 1
S S
o w a  is the skilled labor requirement by















i w w a w w a MC , 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 ) ( ) ( + =       ( 8 )  
Since northern wages are assumed to be given exogenously, marginal cost of 
the northern national firms is just equal to a constant, say,χ . 
 
Section 2.2.3: Pricing Decisions of the firms  
A multinational firm, which splits production between North and South, compete 
with a northern firm. The quality level of the product of a multinational firm is no better 
than that of the northern quality leader. Therefore, multinational firms engage in limit 
pricing and charge a price equal to the marginal cost of production of northern firms, χ . 
On the other hand, price competition among Southern firms drives down good y prices 
to marginal cost equal to one. 





S AC MC P  
 
Section 2.2.4: Industry Flows 
Let  N n  and  M n represent the measure of northern firms and multinational firms 
respectively. In equilibrium, these measures are constant and determined by Northern 
firms’ innovation intensity, the probability of standardization and the probability of 
formation of subsidiary or outsourcing partner. In this model we assume these factors to 
be exogenous. 
 
Section 2.2.5: Resource Constraints 
The last building block of the model is the resource constraint of the South.  
Southern skilled labor required by Southern firms for good y production under i mode of 
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For skilled labor market equilibrium in South, 
 





















i ) ( 1 ) ( , 2 , 2     ( 1 1 )      13 
Similarly, in equilibrium, unskilled labor demand in South is equal to the given 
unskilled labor supply: 
 





















i ) ( 1 ) ( , 1 , 1       ( 1 2 )  
This completes the formulation of the model. We can now turn to the next section 




Section 3: Equilibrium in South and Welfare Comparison 
In this section, we compare the welfare impact of a regime shift of foreign 
investment from say, FDI equilibrium to outsourcing equilibrium (or vice-versa) in the 
host country. We can model the welfare effect of a change in the mode of foreign 
investment in the host country as a comparative static exercise. To carry out this 
exercise, we need to specify one of the two modes of foreign investment as the initial 
equilibrium. Without loss of generality, we may assume that FDI constitutes the initial 
equilibrium
7 in the host country. This implies that, to begin with, the world economy 
being analyzed has all its international investment or fragmented production through 
foreign subsidiaries. Then we may ask whether a regime shift from FDI to outsourcing 
can increase the real GDP of the South and if it is possible, we qualify these conditions. 
We can also reverse our question and qualify conditions under which aggregate real 
wage earnings fall representing a welfare loss after regime shift from FDI to 
outsourcing.  
There are two different components of change in the skill requirements under 
outsourcing. The first of this change is endogenous, which comes about due to changes 
in wages as we move from initial FDI equilibrium to the outsourcing steady state. 
Besides this endogenous change, there also exists an exogenous change in the relative 
demand for the two types of labor emanating from the change in technology of 
                                                 
7 There is nothing sacrosanct about choosing FDI as the initial equilibrium and we could also choose 
outsourcing to constitute the initial equilibrium. This will not
  change the nature of our results and 
conditions obtained. 
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production used under outsourcing vis-à-vis FDI. As noted in the introduction we use 
our assumption that outsourcing production by partners of MNC in the South uses a 
higher skill intensive technique of production vis-à-vis FDI production in foreign 
subsidiaries.  
We split the changes in marginal labor requirements that result from the regime 
shift of foreign investment into the exogenous and endogenous components. Let the 
exogenous rate of change (that corresponds to the change in technology of production) 
in marginal labor requirements with regime switch by the multinational production unit in 









) ( ˆ =      l = 1, 2 











ˆ =      l = 1, 2 and k = S, B 
Both exogenous and endogenous changes in marginal labor requirement entails 
a change in marginal cost of production with a shift from FDI equilibrium to outsourcing 
equilibrium. Totally differentiating
B MC to get the change in marginal cost of production of 
the Southern unit of the multinational firm (as we move from FDI equilibrium to 
outsourcing steady state): 
 
  1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ u u w w C M
B B S B S B B θ θ θ θ + + + =       ( 1 4 )  
And totally differentiating equation (8), we get: 
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ
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= θ  represents the cost share of type l  labor in 
production by k type firm in the host country. 
 
Using the above expression we get that,  
   ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 2 1 2 1
S S
k
k k w w a − − = σ θ   and   ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 2 1 1 2
S S
k
k k w w a − = σ θ    k = S, B  (16)   15 
 
Where k σ is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production. 
Totally differentiating the Southern resource constraints, and substituting for 
k
l a ˆ from 
(16) and  
using 2 2 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ e w e w E
S S + =   

















el = =  and ψ is the share of the host country GDP in global 
GDP, we get the following two equations in 
S w1 ˆ  and  S w2 ˆ
8 
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The above system of equations may be represented in the following matrix form: 
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The set of two equations and the subsequent matrix can be solved to get the 
change in wages due to exogenous increase in skill intensity that happens as a result of 



































    for l =1, 2.  
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Intuitively, when the skill intensity of production increases
9, we would expect the 
skill premium to increase and by equation (15), this implies that an increase in wages of 
skilled labor should necessarily be matched by a fall in wages of unskilled labor.  
To make welfare comparisons across the two alternative regimes of foreign 
investment, we need to look at real wage effect. In the current setup, the Southern 
domestic good is chosen as the numeraire while the price of the multinational good 
depends on the exogenously given marginal cost of northern firms,χ . The only 
difference that arises in price index under the alternative regimes of international 
investment is due to price of the northern firms’ goods
10. The price of northern firm’s 
good is a quality mark up over the marginal cost of the multinational’s production unit in 
the South. Thus, a comparison of real wages in the two mutually exclusive forms of 
international investment must depend on the MC of production of the subsidiary and the 
outsourcing partner
11.  
B C M p ˆ ˆ =  
 
FDI leads to a higher welfare vis-à-vis outsourcing if the real GDP after the 























p w S  

















    
                                                 










10 Since the host is small by assumption a change in marginal cost of MNC production unit in South which 
changes the prices of northern goods is a very small
 component of price index of the North.
 
11  Strictly speaking the price index should change by a proportion of change in marginal cost of 
multinational production, however, to simplify the algebra we



























given by the conditions in the appendix, then a necessary condition for FDI to generate 







ζ<              ( 1 9 . 1 )  
Thus, FDI may lead to a higher welfare relative to outsourcing if the host country 
has a lower absorptive capacity relative to foreign sector absorption of skilled labor.  On 
the other hand, the above result also indicates that a sufficient condition for outsourcing 








ζ>             ( 1 9 . 2 )  
This implies that if the absorptive capacity of the host country is above the 
foreign sector absorption given by relative cost share of skilled labor to unskilled labor in 
the foreign sector, then outsourcing definitely leads to higher welfare. This result is 
intuitive because of the fact that outsourcing values skilled labor more than FDI. Thus, 
outsourcing certainly leads to higher welfare provided the host country has the required 
absorptive capacity.  
This result indicates some lesson for the developing countries that compete 
blindly for FDI offering subsidies and attractive package incentives to the multinationals. 
It makes sense for the host country to attract FDI only if they have low level of skills 
relative to foreign sector absorption in the host country. However, the results also 
indicate that even if the domestic absorptive capacity,ζ, is low, FDI may still not lead to 
higher welfare. On the other hand, if the domestic absorptive capacity is above the 
threshold defined, then, the host country certainly gains from outsourcing contracts 
rather than FDI.  
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Section 4: Comparative Static: The Effect of Investment in Human 
Capital 
   Suppose we allow for investment in human capital formation in South. With an 
investment in education that leads to higher relative supply of skilled labor over the long 
run period, the welfare of the economy is impacted due to changes in wages in steady 
state. Does this necessarily imply a higher level of welfare for the host country and 
whether this impact is higher under FDI or outsourcing? We carry out a comparative 
static exercise within each regime of foreign investment – FDI and outsourcing – and we 
ask the question that under what condition does the real GDP increase with investment 
in human capital. In the current set up of the model, we cannot directly compare the 
differential effects of increase in the relative supply of skilled labor on FDI with that of 
outsourcing. However, we may do so indirectly by comparing conditions under which 
they generate similar result.  
 
Section 4.1: Effect of Human Capital Formation under FDI and outsourcing 
Investment in human capital formation is such that unskilled workers upgrade 
their skills and move to the skilled labor category of workers, keeping the total labor 
force constant.  
Therefore,  
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Totally differentiating the resource constraints, that is, equations (11) and (12) 
and substituting equations (14), (15) and (20), we get the following two total differential 
equations: 
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Since the wages of the two types of labor move in opposite direction by virtue of 
equation (15), it is therefore likely that with investment in human capital, which 
increases the relative supply of skilled labor, the skill premium goes down
12.  
 
Section 4.2: FDI Vs Outsourcing: The Effect of Human Capital Investment  
Welfare rises under FDI or outsourcing after investment in skill if the following condition 
holds: 



























Using equation (7) we get,  S B S B w w C M p M
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Substituting equation (15), and the price change after skill formation, sf p ˆ into the above 
























































θ ζ θ      ( 2 3 )  
 
Thus, condition (23), needs to be satisfied in any regime of foreign investment for 
investment in skill formation to be welfare enhancing. Thus, a necessary condition for 
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real GDP to rise with investment in skill formation, given that skill premium falls with 







ζ< .  
Now, to compare the impact of skill investment under  FDI with that of 
outsourcing, we note that, at given relative wages in the South, higher skill intensity of 
outsourcing partner vis-à-vis foreign subsidiary implies that 
o q
B B
2 2 θ θ < and 
o q
B B
1 1 θ θ > . 















>  Thus, there is a greater chance that the domestic 
absorptive capacity,ζ, is lower (than actual absorption by the MNC production unit) for 







ζ<  is satisfied by FDI regime, then it 
necessarily is satisfied under outsourcing but not vice-versa. Hence, it may pay more to 
have investment in human capital under outsourcing rather than FDI because 
outsourcing values skilled labor more than FDI. Therefore, it is more probable for 
investment in skills under outsourcing to be welfare improving vis-à-vis FDI. 
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
In this paper foreign investment in the form of either FDI or outsourcing is taken 
as an exogenous event and the focus of interest lies on their affect on welfare in the 
host country. The approach that we choose runs as follows. We developed a product 
life-cycle model in this paper that focuses specifically on the events in the host country. 
The distinction between FDI and outsourcing in the model presented is motivated 
essentially by Grossman and Helpman (2003) with a few elements added from 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) and (2002). The empirical and theoretical differences 
between FDI and outsourcing leads to the conclusion that FDI is relatively less skill 
intensive vis-à-vis outsourcing. This conclusion drives a number of results
13 in this 
                                                 
13 It is also possible accommodate the differential impact of FDI and outsourcing on skill formation in the 
host country by endogenizing the skill acquisition
 decision of workers as in Sayek and Sener (2001) and 
Beaulieu et al. (2003). In such a setting, FDI induces skill formation by getting the unskilled labor in close
 
contact with the new technology of the North, while under outsourcing, individuals respond to increased 
skill premium by undertaking training and becoming skilled. 
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paper. It is found that under certain conditions, depending on the absorptive capacity of 
the host country, elasticity of substitution in production and the relative demands 
generated by FDI and outsourcing for the two factors of production, outsourcing or FDI 
may lead to a higher level of real GDP. Specifically, a very interesting result comes 
about through our formal treatment of the model. It is found that, if the absorptive 
capacity of the host is higher than the foreign absorption (given by the ratio of costs 
shares of the skilled and unskilled labor in the foreign sector), then, outsourcing 
certainly leads to higher welfare. However, if the absorptive capacity of the host country 
is below this derived threshold, then, FDI may lead to higher welfare. Even in this case, 
outsourcing being welfare enhancing is not ruled out. This result should raise alarm for 
countries blindly trying to attract FDI by giving incentives especially in the form of 
subsidies and tax relaxation. The second crucial result of this paper concerns the 
relative importance of investment in skill formation in the two alternative modes of 
foreign investment. It is found that efforts to increase skills in the host country is more 
likely to payoff under outsourcing relative to FDI, since outsourcing values skilled labor 
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Appendix 
 
The two alternative conditions under which skill premium to increases with outsourcing 
are: 





A 1 2 1 1 2 2 θ θ λ λ < ⇒ < . Thus, if a weighted measure of elasticity of 
substitution between the two types of labor is lower (than the expenditure share of the 
unskilled labor), then, a sufficient condition for skill premium to rise with outsourcing is 
that the cost share of unskilled labor must be greater than the share of skilled labor in 
the foreign sector. The intuition for this result is simple. With high unskilled labor share 
in the foreign sector, a shift to outsourcing (from FDI) dramatically increases the 
demand for skilled labor that tends to raise skill premium. On the other hand, a low 
degree of substitutability between the factors does not allow easy substitution of 
unskilled with skilled labor. Therefore the wages of skilled labor definitely rise. 





A 1 2 1 1 2 2 θ θ λ λ > ⇒ > . That is, if a weighted measure of elasticity of 
substitution is higher (than the expenditure share of the unskilled labor), then, a 
necessary condition for skill premium to rise with outsourcing is that the cost share of 
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